Arkansas Law Review
Volume 72

Number 2

Article 10

December 2019

Recent Developments
Raelynn J. Hillhouse
University of Michigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raelynn J. Hillhouse, Recent Developments, 72 Ark. L. Rev. 557 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol72/iss2/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Arkansas Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact
scholar@uark.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
NIELSEN V. PREAP1
Plaintiffs challenged immigration authorities picking them up and
detaining them without bond years after they had been released
after serving criminal sentences. Plaintiffs argued that the
mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (8 U.S. C. § 1226(c)(2)) only applied at the
time deportable aliens who had committed enumerated crimes
were released from custody, and did not apply years later. The
Court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Act applies
even if the individuals are not detained immediately after released
from criminal detention.

GARZA V. IDAHO2
A criminal defendant in Idaho state court who had signed two plea
agreements in which he expressly waived his right to appeal,
subsequently informed his attorney that he wanted to appeal, but
the attorney failed to file a notice of appeal. Because of this, the
defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel in state
postconviction proceedings, but the state courts held that he could
not show ineffective assistance of counsel as required under
Strickland v. Washington.3 The Court held that a presumption of
prejudice inheres whenever counsel fails to file an appeal when
instructed regardless of whether he has signed an appeal waiver.

CULBERTSON V. BERRYHILL4
An attorney successfully won four denials of social security
disability claims in court, but the court capped his fee for both the
court and underlying administrative proceeding at “25 percent of
1.
2.
3.
4.

No. 16-1363, slip op. (Mar. 19, 2019).
139 S.Ct. 738 (2019).
466 U.S. 668 (1984)
139 S.Ct. 517 (2019).
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the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant [was]
entitled” pursuant to the Social Security Act.5 The attorney
petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that the cap applied solely
to his court-related fees. The Court held that the 25 percent of
past-due benefits cap on attorneys’ fees applies only to court
representation and not to an aggregate of court and administrative
proceedings.

TIMBS V. INDIANA6
Petitioner pleaded guilty to drug distribution charges and was
sentenced to one year of home detention and five years of
probation. The Indiana court also ordered the forfeiture of this
Range Rover, valued at four times the maximum fine for his
offenses. He challenged this under the Eight Amendment’s
excessive fines clause. The Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause incorporates the
Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause against the states.
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